Abstract Signcryption is a very important technology in message security and the sender's identity authentication for communication in the open channel. To adapt multi-user settings, this paper defined the formal model of identity-based multi-signcryption scheme and proposed the first identity-based multi-signcryption scheme without random oracles based on Waters' identity-based encryption scheme. The scheme is proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptive chosen message attacks under decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and computational Diffie-Hellman assumption respectively.
Introduction
Identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystems were introduced by Shamir [1] in 1984. Its main idea is that the public keys of a user can be easily derived from arbitrary strings corresponding to his identity information such as name, telephone number or email address. A private key generator (PKG) computes private keys from a master secret and distributes these to the users participating in the scheme. This eliminates the need for certificates as used in a traditional public key infrastructure. ID-based systems may be a good alternative for certificate-based systems from the viewpoint of efficiency and convenience. Since Boneh and Franklin gave a practical ID-based encryption scheme [2] from Weil pairing in 2001, a large number of papers have been published in this area such as [3] [4] [5] [6] .
In 1997, Zheng [7] proposed a new cryptographic primitive: signcryption, which can perform digital signature and public key encryption simultaneously at lower computational costs and communication overheads than sign-then-encrypt way to obtain private and authenticated communications in the open channel. Since then, there are many signcryption schemes proposed.
By combining ID-based cryptology and signcryption, Malone-Lee [8] proposed the first ID-based signcryption scheme. But Libert and Quisquater [9] pointed out that Malone-Lee's scheme is not semantically secure. Chow et al. [10] proposed an ID-based signcryption scheme that can provide both public verifiability and forward security. In 2003, Boyen [11] proposed a secure ID-based signcryption scheme with ciphertext anonymity and provable secure in the random oracle model.
In [12] , Chen and Malone-Lee improved Boyen's scheme in efficient. Barreto et al. proposed an efficient ID-based signcryption scheme [13] . Yu et al. [14] propose the first ID-based signcryption scheme without random oracles.
To adapt multi-user settings, Duan et al. proposed a multi-receiver ID-based signcryption scheme [15] and Bellare et al. gave an ID-based multi-signature scheme [16] based on RSA. In everyday life, many legal documents require signatures from more than one party. At the same time, the signers perhaps don't want someone else except the legal receiver to know the content of the signed message. Signing a secret contract by multi-parties is a good example to illustrate this case. Recently, Zhang et al. [17] proposed the first ID-based multi-signcryption scheme to complete efficient transmission and authentication in multi-party oriented environment. The security of the scheme was proven secure in the random oracle model [18] . Although the model is efficient and useful, it has been shown that when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions, the resulting scheme may not be secure [19] . Therefore, it is an important research problem to construct a secure ID-based multi-signcryption scheme without random oracles.
Our contribution
In this paper, motivated by Malone-Lee's ID-based signcryption scheme [8] and Waters' IDbased encryption scheme [5] , we define formal model of ID-based multi-signcryption scheme and propose the first ID-based multi-signcryption scheme without random oracles. Our scheme is proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptive chosen message attacks.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the formal model of ID-based multisigncryption scheme without random oracles is described. In section 3, we describe related mathematical problems and complexity assumptions. We describe the proposed ID-based multisigncryption scheme in section 4 and give the security and efficient analysis of the scheme in section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6.
2 Formal model of ID-based multi-signcryption schemes
Generic scheme
An ID-based multi-signcryption scheme consists of the following algorithms.
Setup: Given a security parameter k, PKG generates a master key S and common parameters P. P is made public while S is kept secret. 2 1 ) and obtains the message m or the symbol ⊥ indicating that the ciphertext is invalid.
Extract

Security notions
Now we recall Malone-Lee's [8] security models for ID-based signcryption scheme. In the following, we modify his definitions to adapt for our ID-based multi-signcryption scheme.
Besides the confidentiality defined in [17] , the unforgeability has also formally defined in our security model. Setup The challenger ϑ runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and obtains common parameters P and a master key S. He sends P to the adversary and keeps S secret.
First stage
The adversary performs a polynomially bounded number of queries. These queries may be made adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
• Key Guess Finally, the adversary produces a bit γ ′ and wins the game if γ γ = ′ .
Note that the security models described above deals with insider security since the adversary is assumed to have access to the private key of the signcrypter of a signcrypted message. This means that the scheme is security even if a signcrypter's private key is compromised.
Definition 2. An ID-based multi-signcryption scheme is said to be secure against an existential forgery for adaptive chosen message attacks (EUF-IDMSC-CMA) if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.
Setup The challenger ϑ runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter k and obtains common parameters P and a master key S. He sends P to the adversary and keeps S secret.
Queries The adversary performs a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively just like in the previous definition.
Forgery Finally, the adversary produces a new triple (σ, B ID , Note that this definition allows the adversary to access to most secret key of the signcrypter and the receiver, which guarantees the insider security.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the basic concepts on bilinear pairings and some related complexity assumptions.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G and T G be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p and g be a generator of
is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true.
(1) e is bilinear, i.e.
(2) e is non-degenerate, i.e.
(3) e is efficiently computable.
Complexity assumptions
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption
The challenger chooses
at random and then flips a fair binary coin β . If
The adversaryθ must then output a guess β ′ of β .
An adversary has at least an ε advantage in solving the decisional BDH problem if
where the probability is over the randomly chosen z c b a , , , and the random bits consumed byθ .
Definition 3. The decisional ε -DBDH assumption holds if no adversary has at least ε advantage in solving the above game.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
The challenger chooses p Z b a ∈ , at random and outputs ) , , (
The adversary then attempts to output G g ab ∈
. An adversar θ has at least an ε advantage if
where the probability is over the randomly chosen a, b and the random bits consumed byθ .
Definition 4. The computational ε -CDH assumption holds if no adversary has at least ε advantage in solving the above game.
The concrete scheme
In the section, we describe our ID-based multi-signcryption scheme. In the following, all the identities will be assumed to be bit string of length u n . A collision resistant Hash function should be employed to construct a more flexible scheme which allows identities of arbitrary length. Our scheme is inspired by Waters' ID-based encryption scheme and consists of the following algorithms.
Setup: Choose groups G and T G of prime order p such that an admissible pairing
can be constructed and pick a generator g of G .
Now, pick a random secret
of length u n and m n , respectively, whose entries are random elements from G. Let H, H m are cryptography hash functions where
where t l is the length of plaintext. The public
and the master secret S is 5 Analysis of the scheme
Correctness
The correctness of the scheme can be directly verified by the following equations.
) , ( game. Our proof is based on Waters' idea such as in [5, 6] .
Setup
and an m n -length vector
For ease of analysis, we define the functions for an identity u and a message m respectively.
Then the challenger assigns a set of public parameters as follows. , it is easy to see that
Thus the former condition will be sufficient to ensure that ϑ will not aborts in extraction queries.
• Probability of success Now we have to assess ϑ 's probability of success. For the simulation to complete without aborting, we require the following conditions fulfilled:
(1) Extraction queries on an identity u have
(2) Multi-signcryption queries on a message m have
(3) Unsigncryption queries on a ciphertext σ have
in the challenge stage. , and X , we have
On the other hand, for any i, the event i
A and A′ are independent, so we have Proof. Assume that a EUF-IDMSC-CMA forger for our scheme exists, we will construct a challenger ϑ , who runs the forger as a subroutine to solve an instance of CDH problem. ϑ is given a group G, a generator g and elements . After ϑ defines functions
Then, the forger can perform a polynomially bounded number of queries including private key 
Efficiency analysis
We compare the new scheme to the first ID-based signcryption scheme [14] without random oracles, which is a 1-to-1 signcryption type. Our scheme is a multi-signcryption scheme, thus, it should belong to a n-to-1 signcryption type. To realize justice comparison, let 1 = n , then these two schemes are converted into 1-to-1 type. In the following table we denote by E an exponentiation, by M a scalar multiplication and by P a computation of the pairing. Other operations are omitted in the following analysis since their computation cost is trivial. We consider the pre-computation here and do not take hash evaluations into account. 
It can be seen from table 1 that our unsigncryption phase has one pairing computation, which is the operation takes the most running time, less than that in [14] .
Conclusions
In this paper, we have modified Malone-Lee's [8] security models for ID-based signcryption scheme to adapt for our ID-based multi-signcryption scheme. The confidentiality and unforgeability have been formally defined in our security model. We have proposed a concrete IDbased multi-signcryption scheme based on Waters' identity based encryption scheme. To our best knowledge, this is the first ID-based multi-signcryption scheme that can be proven secure without random oracles. The scheme is proved secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks and adaptive chosen message attacks under decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption and computational Diffie-Hellman assumption respectively. been shown that when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions, the resulting scheme may not be secure. Therefore, it is an important research problem to construct a secure IDbased multi-signcryption scheme without random oracles.
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